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Comments
DISRUPTIVE DEFENDANTS AND PREJUDICE-PRONE
JURORS: TOWARD AN IMPLIED WAIVER
OF TRIAL BY JURY?
I. THE PROBLEM
Disruption, disobedience, disrespect: bad anywhere, these in-
dices of civil unrest are especially undesirable in the courtroom.
Yet our courtrooms have not been able to avoid disruptive be-
havior. Particularly troublesome is the disruptive criminal defend-
ant, sometimes characterized as the "political" defendant. He uses
the courtroom as a forum for the vociferous airing of political and
social views. More than that, he and his counsel may draw upon an
arsenal of disruptive and delaying tactics, vilifying the judge and
prosecution and prolonging the proceedings at tremendous cost.
Moreover, the defendant may benefit by his misconduct. For ex-
ample, in the 1944 sedition trial' the defendants and their counsel
deliberately obstructed the trial proceedings with the result that
the judge, unable to withstand their constant abuse, collapsed and
died. A mistrial was declared and the prosecutor, unwilling to face
another seven-month ordeal, decided to discontinue the prosecu-
tion.
2
This Comment will focus upon the problem of how to cope with
disruptive defendants. It will discuss several approaches to this
problem suggested by courts and commentators. Additionally, a
1. For an interesting account of the 1944 sedition trial and similar
"political" trials, see Nizer, Order in the Court!, READER'S DIGEST, July





new alternative for the control of disruptive defendants will be ex-
amined.
The new alternative takes into account the fact that much of
the difficulty encountered in "political" trials stems from the pres-
ence of the jury and the necessity of keeping the jury free from
prejudice and confusion. The possibility that the jury will be prej-
udiced by the defendant's outbursts-possibly in the defendant's
favor and possibly against him-necessitates restraint of the defend-
ant. However, since the jury might also be prejudiced by any at-
tempt by the judge to restrain or censure the defendant, the judge
is handicapped in his efforts to control the defendant and maintain
a fair and speedy trial. Particularly distressing is the self-restraint
which the judge must exercise when subjected to abusive personal
attacks. Such restraint is often necessary, however, to keep the
jury free from possible prejudice.
This Comment will discuss an "implied waiver" approach to
the right of trial by jury as a possible solution to the confusion, prej-
udice, delay, and disorder engendered by the coexistence of the dis-
ruptive defendant and the prejudice-prone jury. The implied
waiver, supportable by modern trends in legal thinking, can be of
value when applied to the disruptive defendant; but it also entails
legal and practical problems.
II. EXISTING SOLUTIONS
Several solutions to the problem of the disruptive defendant
have been proposed, and in some cases adopted. They may be di-
vided into two categories: disciplinary measures and "implied
waiver".
A. Disciplinary Measures
The disciplinary category includes measures which are de-
signed to curtail misconduct anticipatorily, and to punish miscon-
duct after it occurs. These disciplinary measures, however, are
more effective in controlling counsel than they are in controlling
defendants, since attorneys generally have more to lose by being
disciplined.
1. Contempt Citation
The court may punish obstreperous conduct with a criminal
contempt citation. The distinction between civil and criminal con-
tempt is not altogether clear, but in general the distinction lies in
the purpose for which the contempt power is used.3 If adminis-
tered for the purpose of punishing the offender, preserving the au-
thority of the court, and promoting the fair administration of jus-
tice, the contempt is considered criminal.4
Summary exercise of the criminal contempt power, though of
ancient origin and predicated upon the inherent power of a court to
maintain order, has been criticized as being too susceptible to abuse.
5
Abuse is possible because the contemner has traditionally been de-
nied many of the recognized requirements of due process, including
notice, the right to counsel, an opportunity to defend, and the right
to a jury trial." Apprehension concerning judicial abuse of such a
broad contempt power has resulted in the creation of a variety of
legislative and judicial restrictions.7 Of particular importance to
the disruptive defendant is the restriction imposed by the United
States Supreme Court in Cheff v. Schnackenberg.8  As a matter
of federal policy the Court held that sentences exceeding six months
for criminal contempt may not be imposed by federal courts with-
out a jury trial unless a jury trial has been waivedf The right to a
jury trial in the case of a two-year contempt sentence was placed
upon constitutional grounds and applied to state courts in Bloom v.
Illinois.10 The United States Supreme Court declared that crimi-
nal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense for purposes of the
fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments."'
Now a state judge cannot sentence an obstreperous defendant
or his counsel to a prison term exceeding six months12 without
granting a jury trial. This limits the judge's ability to control dis-
3. Generally, if the purpose is coercive and remedial, the contempt
is considered civil. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-71 (1966).
4. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 210 (1968); In re Debs, 158 U.S.
564, 596 (1895).
5. See generally Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Comment,
Dealing with Unruly Persons in the Courtroom, 48 N.C. L. REv. 878 (1970).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
9. Id. at 380.
10. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
11. Id. at 201.
12. The precise dividing line for the constitutional requirement of a
jury trial has been at issue in several cases decided by the Supreme Court.
The six-month rule of Cheff, applicable only to federal courts, was based
upon the opinions of six justices, four of whom rested their opinions on the
Court's "supervisory" power, and two of whom rested their opinions on
constitutional grounds. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 381 (1966)
(concurring opinion). Bloom, on the other hand, was placed squarely on
constitutional grounds, and made applicable to state courts, but the sen-
tence in question was for two years and the Court declined to rule upon
the constitutionality of a non-jury sentence of less than two years but
longer than six months. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968). In
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 91 S. Ct. 499 (1971), the Supreme Court's only
objection to the summary imposition of eleven contempt sentences of one
to two years each was that the sentences should have been imposed by a
judge not involved with the trial on the merits. Apparently the location
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ruptive behavior through contempt citations. A jury trial on the
contempt charge would merely afford the contumacious party a
second opportunity to disrupt judicial proceedings. The suggestion
has been made that the six-month barrier 13 can be surmounted by
cumulating several shorter contempt sentences, but the legality of
this suggestion is uncertain.
14
The trend of authority is toward restricting the court's sum-
mary contempt power.15 Moreover, appellate courts have shown
an increasing willingness to examine de novo the facts surrounding
a summary citation.'6 Thus, the contempt power is not the com-
plete answer to the problem of disruptive behavior. Another draw-
back of the contempt sentence is that it has its greatest effect on
counsel and not on the defendant. The defendant, if already on
trial facing a severe penalty, will probably be undaunted by the ad-
dition of a summary contempt sentence. In fact, the true "political"
defendant may even welcome the publicity resulting from a con-
tempt citation.
2. Removal and Suspension of Attorney
A disruptive attorney may be removed from the trial.17 The
client cannot complain because, as the attorney's principal, he has
impliedly consented to the attorney's course of conduct. Addition-
ally, since a judge can summarily imprison an attorney for con-
tempt, it has been argued that the judge can also invoke lesser and
included measures.' 8 One such measure is the suspension of the at-
torney's right to appear in any court in the same jurisdiction, and
possibly in any court in the country, for a period of at least six
months. 19 Finally, disciplinary proceedings may be instituted to
of the dividing line has finally been settled by the Supreme Court in Bald-
win v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) which held that a jury trial is con-
stitutionally required for any offense punishable by a sentence in excess of
six months.
13. See discussion note 12 supra.
14. Note, however, that in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 91 S. Ct. 499
(1971) (discussed in note 12 supra), the Supreme Court, while reversing
on a related ground, did not specifically object to the non-jury imposi-
tion of eleven contempt sentences. The contemner was sentenced to not
less than one, nor more than two years for each of the eleven contempts
or a total of eleven to twenty-two years.
15. See note 5 supra.
16. Comment, Dealing with Unruly Persons in the Courtroom, 48 N.C.
L. REv. 878, 890 (1970).
17. See generally AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON DISRUPTION OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, reported in
CASE & COM., Sept.-Oct. 1970, at 28.
18. Id. Principle VI and Commentary.
19. Id.




Louis Nizer has suggested that legislation should be enacted
making courtroom misconduct a felony. The felony would be
known as obstruction of justice.21 The effect of such legislation
would be somewhat similar to the contempt citation. However, the
obstruction legislation would afford several additional advantages.
The charge of obstruction of justice could be added to the other
charges already on trial. Unlike contempt proceedings, the jury
that decides the original charges could also decide the obstruction
charges. Since the jurors would all be eye witnesses to the alleged
crime of obstruction of justice, and since all the necessary evidence
would be readily available, prosecution of the offense could be
handled swiftly. If the penalty for the obstruction of justice charge
approximated the penalty for the original charges, the prosecutor
could bring the trial to a quick end simply by accepting a conviction
for the crime of obstruction of justice and dropping the other
charges. This procedure would be particularly suitable for a "polit-
ical" trial where the alternative might be a multi-month, disor-
derly, costly, and highly-publicized trial. The penalty imposed for
violation of an obstruction of justice statute could approximate,
within limits, the penalty which could be imposed for the original
charges. Such a penalty would be analogous to an "accessory"
statute imposing upon the abettor of a crime a penalty commensu-
rate with that imposed upon the perpetrator of the crime.22 Dis-
ruptive defendants and counsel could be convicted for violation of
an obstruction of justice statute.23
B. Implied Waiver of Rights
The second method of controlling unruly defendants is the "im-
plied waiver" approach which operates on the premise that rights
may be "waived" or "lost." Although there may be an academic dis-
tinction between the defendant who, by his conduct, has impliedly
"waived" a right, and the defendant whose conduct has caused him
to "lose" the right, the result and underlying rationale is the same.24
20. See, e.g., id. Principle XI and Commentary.
21. Nizer, Order in the Court!, REAFm's DIGEST, July 1970, at 95, 99,
condensed from N.Y. Times, April 5, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 12, 15.
22. See, e.g., State v. Nance, 77 N.M. 39, 419 P.2d 242, cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1039 (1966).
23. See generally Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 91 S. Ct. 499, 506 (1971)
(concurring opinion).
24. The Supreme Court in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) used
the word "lost" rather than "waived". Id. at 346. This change in termi-
nology has been regarded by one writer as significant. Comment, Dealing
with Unruly Persons in the Courtroom, 48 N.C. L. REv. 878, 884 (1970).




Since most authorities refer to the result as an "implied waiver"
rather than as a "loss," the former designation is the one which
has been adopted for the purposes of this Comment.
The underlying rationale of the implied waiver approach turns
upon the defendant's conduct at trial; if his conduct is inconsistent
with the proper exercise of one of his rights, the defendant is
deemed, by his inconsistent conduct, to have "waived" the right.
For example, the defendant normally has the right to be present at
his trial, but this right carries with it attendant duties, including
maintenance of proper demeanor. If the defendant is disruptive
and fails to fulfill his duty of good behavior, he is acting inconsist-
ently with his right to be present, and thereby impliedly waives the
right.25 The justification for the implied waiver derives not only
from the notion that a defendant cannot assert inconsistent rights,
but also from the maxim that a defendant should not be entitled
to benefit from his own wrongful and disruptive conduct.
The following are rights which obstreperous defendants have
been deemed to have waived.
1. The Right to be Present at Trial
The right to be present at trial, which includes the right to
counsel and the right to confront one's accusers, 26 has been regarded
as waived by defendants who persist in being disruptive. The
United States Supreme Court, in Illinois v. Allen,2 7 decided that
either complete physical removal of the defendant,28 or shackling
and gagging,29 is a permissible consequence of the "waiver" or
"loss"30 of the right to be present at trial.
If the defendant is physically removed from the courtroom he
should at least be apprised of the progress of his trial. For example,
he should be sent the stenographic minutes of each day's proceed-
ings. Additional safeguards of the defendant's rights have been
suggested. Perhaps the defendant could be permitted to oversee his
trial, either by closed circuit television or by a telephone connec-
tion with his counsel. Another alternative would be to place the
defendant in a box in the rear of the courtroom. The box could per-
mit the defendant a full view of the proceedings, or limit the de-
25. Waiver of the right to be present at trial will be more fully
discussed infra.
26. These rights are derived from U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
27. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
28. Id. at 344.
29. Id.
30. See discussion note 24 supra.
fendant's view of the proceedings and likewise limit the view which
the jury would have of the defendant. A primary difficulty with
these suggestions is that they entail considerable expense in addi-
tion to the costs already caused by the defendant's disruptive and
delaying tactics. Allen does not require such expenditures, and it
seems unreasonable to enable defendants, by their unruliness, to
place such an additional financial burden on our courts.
The shackling and gagging alternative also has its drawbacks.
It is acceptable if there is a clear danger that the defendant will
commit acts of violence or will attempt to escape. 3' In such cases
even the stationing of armed guards around the courtroom is per-
missible.32 However, absent the possibility of violence or escape,
shackling and gagging is an undesirable alternative. Although the
jury may be prejudiced by the defendant's complete absence from
the trial, it is much more apt to be prejudiced by the sight of the
defendant bound and gagged. Moreover, such a sight offends the
dignity of the court.
33
2. Right to a Speedy Trial
The right to a speedy trial can also be impliedly waived by dis-
ruptive conduct. 34 The judge may, therefore, declare a continuance
until such time as the defendant is willing to guarantee that he will
not be disruptive.33 If the defendant is able to obtain bail, the con-
tinuance method of dealing with unruly defendants is obviously in-
adequate. As a solution to this inadequacy, the United States Su-
preme Court has held that a disorderly defendant may be impris-
oned for civil contempt during the period of the continuance. 30 If,
during the continuance, a juror becomes unavailable and is later
replaced, or if a new jury is subsequently impanelled, the defendant
is precluded from raising a "double jeopardy" defense, as discussed
infra.37 Of course, if witnesses are apt to become unavailable, the
continuance method should not be employed.
3. Right not to be Twice Placed in Jeopardy
If, after the declaration of a continuance or mistrial, a juror
becomes unavailable and is later replaced, or if a new jury is sub-
sequently impanelled, the defendant is not permitted to raise the
defense of double jeopardy. In case a juror becomes unavailable,
31. Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
873 (1951).
32. United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 940 (1963).
33. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970).
34. Id. at 345 (by implication).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See discussion accompanying notes 38-42 infra.
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the defendant has two options:ss (1) He may elect to proceed with
a jury of less than twelve, thus waiving his right to a twelve-man
jury;39 or (2) he may choose to have a new juror, or an entirely dif-
ferent jury impanelled, impliedly waiving his right to plead double
jeopardy.4 0 Depriving the defendant of the double jeopardy de-
fense in such a case is based upon the rule of necessity.
41
If the defendant's misconduct results in a mistrial and an en-
tirely new jury is subsequently impanelled, the defendant is like-
wise precluded from raising a double jeopardy defense. The de-
fendant's misconduct operates as an implied waiver of his double
jeopardy right to prevent the defendant from benefiting from his
own wrongful conduct.
4 2
Thus, the implied "double jeopardy" waiver is justifiable.
However, it is not an affirmative answer to the judge's problem of
coping with the unruly defendant. The defendant is merely af-
forded a new trial and thus has a second opportunity to be disrup-
tive.
4. Right to a Public Trial
In "political" trials in which the defendant has actively encour-
aged the spectators to disrupt the proceedings, the court may order
the removal of the unruly spectators. This action is authorized on
the theory that the defendant has impliedly waived his right to a
public trial, or more traditionally, on the theory that the trial judge
has the inherent power to oust disorderly spectators in order to
maintain order, avoid overcrowding, and prevent undue strain on
witnesses.
43
A limiting factor on the judge's right to expel spectators is
the generally accepted view that the right to a public trial belongs
38. A juror may become insane, ill, or otherwise unavailable. Collins
v. State, 220 Tenn. 23, 413 S.W.2d 683, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 824 (1967).
39. The defendant may waive the presence of one or more, or even
all of the jurors. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
40. United States v. Burrell, 324 F.2d 115 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 937 (1963); United States v. Gori, 282 F.2d 43 (2d Cir.), aff'd,
367 U.S. 364 (1960); United States v. Harriman, 130 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); Collins v. State, 220 Tenn. 23, 413 S.W.2d 683, cert. denied, 389 U.S.
824 (1967).
41. United States v. Gori, 282 F.2d 43 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 367 U.S. 364
(1960); United States v. Harriman, 130 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Mack
v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 921, 15 S.E.2d 62 (1941).
42. Commonwealth ex Tel. Green v. Rundle, 422 Pa. 236, 221 A.2d 187
(1966); Mack v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 921, 15 S.E.2d 62 (1941).
43. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949); see also
Comment, Dealing with Unruly Persons in the Courtroom, 48 N.C. L. REv.
878, 885 (1970).
not only to the defendant, but also to the public, to enable it to over-
see the administration of the law.44 Thus the judge, in expelling
spectators, may leave himself open to criticism for conducting "Star-
Chamber" proceedings. To avert such criticism, while preserving
order in "political" trials, it has been suggested that the judge in-
vite representatives of such groups as the American Civil Liberties
Union to attend the trial in lieu of public spectators.
45
III. IMPLIED WAIVER OF TRIAL BY JURY
A. Background
The disruptive defendant challenges the judicial system to con-
trol his misconduct without depriving him of due process. In re-
sponse to the defendant's challenge, several measurer have been
employed, with varying degrees of success.
The "implied waiver" is one such measure. Courts following
the implied waiver theory have found implied waivers of the right
to be present at trial,46 the right to a speedy trial,47 the right to a
public trial,48 and the right to be free from double jeopardy.
49
Waivers of these rights, while legally justified, are not entirely
satisfactory in regulating courtroom misconduct. The implied
waiver of the double jeopardy right merely affords the defendant a
second opportunity to be disruptive. The same objection applies to
the waiver of the right to a speedy trial; the defendant can simply
prolong his disruptive tactics. Even the defendant's waiver of his
right to a public trial may have no direct effect upon him.
A more effective waiver, from the standpoint of controlling un-
ruly conduct, is the defendant's implied waiver of his right to be
present at trial. However, even this waiver entails difficulties.
The possibility that the defendant's absence will prejudice the jury
is very strong. Even stronger is the possibility of prejudice arising
from binding and gagging the defendant in the jury's presence.
Furthermore, the defendant may be materially hampered in pre-
paring his defense if he is shackled or imprisoned during trial. Cor-
rective measures have been suggested to reduce the possibility of
jury prejudice and to help the defendant oversee his trial, but they
involve considerable expense and inconvenience. 50
44. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949).
45. Nizer, Order in the Court!, READERS DIGEST, July 1970, at 95, 99,
condensed from N.Y. Times, April 5, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 12, 15.
46. See discussion accompanying notes 26-33 supra.
47. See discussion accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
48. See discussion accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
49. See discussion accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
50. These measures include the use of stenographic minutes, telephone
connections, and closed circuit television sets when the defendant is re-
moved from the courtroom, and the use of an Eichmann-type box if the
defendant is permitted to remain in the courtroom. See the discussion of
these measures in Part II, B, I supra.
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B. Operation and Effect
As an additional and possibly more effective means of control-
ling unruly defendants, a new waiver is here proposed: an implied
waiver of trial by jury. The operation of this waiver is the same as
for the other waivers. Basically, the defendant may be deemed to
have waived his jury trial right if his acts are inconsistent with
the proper exercise of the right. Courts may reasonably expect that
to derive the benefits of a jury trial, defendants will discharge the
duties which such a trial entails. The duties include cooperation in
keeping the jury free from prejudice and confusion, and the trial
free of violence, abusive outbursts, and unjustified delay.
Accordingly, after persistent disruptive outbursts, acts of vio-
lence, or unjustified delay, the defendant should be warned that
his conduct is inconsistent with the proper exercise of his right
to a trial by jury, and that subsequent disruptions of a similar na-
ture will be construed as an election on the defendant's part to
forego his jury-right.
There are several advantages to an implied waiver of the right
to trial by jury. Just the warning that further misconduct may
result in dismissal of the jury might induce better behavior if the
defendant is adverse to a non-jury trial. If, however, the defendant
persists in his disruptive conduct, the judge could then dismiss the
jury and proceed without it. Thereafter, the judge would no longer
be hamstrung by the omnipresent danger of jury prejudice and
the commission of reversible error in his efforts to restrain the de-
fendant's outbursts. Not only would the judge be better able to
maintain order, but the defendant would be less likely to continue
his abusive conduct, knowing the judge to be the arbiter of his
guilt. A further advantage is the elimination of the possibility that
charges against "political" defendants would be dismissed on the
ground that it is impossible to obtain an impartial jury.51
An added advantage of the jury waiver is economy. Justice is
supposedly not concerned with financial matters. Nevertheless, as
long as justice is done, it is relevant to determine which measure ac-
complishes the just result most economically. It is significant that
most of the measures presently employed or suggested to control
unruly defendants entail varying costs to accomplish their purpose.
51. An example is the recent murder-kidnapping prosecution against
defendants Huggins and Seale. Following a hung jury and a resultant
mistrial, all charges against the defendants were dismissed on the ground
that it would be "virtually impossible" to obtain an impartial jury. It
had taken four months to impanel the first jury. N.Y. Times, May 26,
1971, § 1, at 1, col. 8.
The jury trial waiver is the only measure which would actually de-
crease the cost of prosecution.
The jury trial waiver can therefore be an effective and efficient
means of controlling disruptive conduct. It is, however, subject
to legal and practical objections.
C. Legal and Practical Objections
The two principal legal objections are that the implied jury
trial waiver will have a "chilling effect" on the defendant's "politi-
cal" activities within the courtroom, and that the waiver is uncon-
stitutional.
The "chilling effect" argument has little to recommend it. The
defendant has no right to disrupt judicial proceedings in the first
place, and cannot claim such a right by designating his disruptive
conduct "political." Since the defendant has no legally protected
right, he cannot complain that his activities have been "chilled."
Furthermore, the "chilling effect" argument, if valid, would pre-
clude all attempts to control unruly defendants and would not be
limited to the jury trial waiver.
The second legal objection, regarding the constitutionality of the
implied jury trial waiver, is more serious. The problem presented
is twofold: whether a jury trial may be waived at all, and whether
it may be waived by implication.
Originally the right to a jury trial in a criminal prosecution was
considered so fundamental by federal courts and most state courts
that it could not be waived.52 So even if a defendant expressly
and knowingly waived the right, the waiver was generally not up-
held.5 3 However, since the Supreme Court decided Patton v.
United States54 in 1930, the trend has been toward allowing express
jury trial waivers. 55 In Patton the Court declared that a defendant
could expressly waive his right to a jury trial in either felony or
misdemeanor prosecutions.56
Assuming that an express jury waiver is valid, the next ques-
tion concerns the constitutionality of an implied jury waiver. The
other rights discussed in this Comment have been impliedly waived
without constitutional objection. The question is whether the jury
trial right is so basic that, unlike the defendant's other rights, it can-
not be waived by implication.
52. Comment, The Historical Development of Waiver of Jury Trial in
Criminal Cases, 20 VA. L. REv. 655, 656 (1934); Comment, Waiver of Jury
in Felony Cases, 20 CALIF. L. REV. 132, 134 (1931).
53. Comment, The Historical Development of Waiver of Jury Trial in
Criminal Cases, 20 VA. L. REV. 655, 656 (1934).
54. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
55. See generally Comment, The Historical Development of Waiver of
Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 20 VA. L. Rsv. 655 (1934); Comment, Waiver
of Jury in Felony Cases, 20 CALIF. L. REv. 132 (1931).
56. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 309 (1930).
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The Constitution itself does not provide an answer to this ques-
tion. There is no clear-cut statement of the meaning and applica-
tion of the "trial by jury" provision.' 7 As a result, varying mean-
ings have been attached by courts to the phrase "trial by jury."
Originally, the Supreme Court ruled that a twelve-man jury was
required by the Constitution. 58 Recently, however, the Court has
declared that a jury of less than twelve is constitutionally permissi-
ble."' This trend toward relaxing the jury requirement, coupled
with the Supreme Court's recent endorsement of an implied waiver
of the right to be present at trial,6 0 may point toward the Court's
acceptance of an implied jury trial waiver.
Significantly, the Constitution has been interpreted as permitting
trial without jury, even absent defendant's consent, in certain situ-
ations. The situations include petty offense cases, extradition ac-
tions, "quasi-criminal" proceedings such as deportation, criminal
contempt citations, and military trials. 61 There is a noticeable
trend however, particularly in petty offense and criminal contempt
cases, toward broadening the application of the jury trial require-
ment. Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that the classifica-
tion of petty offenses, where there is no right to a trial by jury, is
restricted to those offenses punishable by a sentence of six months
or less. 62 The Court will presumably apply the six-month rule to
contempt proceedings against contumacious defendants; if the con-
tempt sentence is for more than six months, the defendant is en-
titled to a jury trial on the contempt charge.6 3 This protection of
the contemner's jury right makes Court's acceptance of an implied
jury trial waiver questionable.
A final, practical objection to the jury waiver exists. If the
defendant fails to heed the judge's warnings and continues to be
abusive and disruptive after the jury is dismissed, the question
arises of whether the judge, as the new trier of fact, is apt to be
as prejudiced as the original jury. Since the implied waiver of the
jury is partly based on the defendant's failure to keep the jury free
of prejudice, the waiver loses much of its justification if the judge
57. On the ambiguity of U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, and amend. VI,
providing for trial by jury, see generally Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970).
58. The leading case on this point is Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343
(1898).
59. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
60. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
61. See Orfield, Trial by Jury in Federal Criminal Procedure, 1962
DUKE L.J. 29.
62. See discussion note 12 supra.
63. See discussion note 12 supra.
is as prone to prejudice as the jury.
Theoretically, the judge is better able to avoid personal preju-
dice. However, the judge's dual role as disciplinarian and repre-
sentative of the "political system" disdained by the defendant may
make the judge the constant butt of invective from the defendant.
Under such circumstances it may be difficult for the judge to avoid
bias.
One solution to the prejudice problem is to have one judge pre-
side over the trial and have a second judge try the facts in lieu of a
jury. If most of the defendant's outbursts were leveled at the pre-
siding judge, the second judge would be relatively bias-free and
able to arrive at a fair verdict.
Another answer to the problem of the judge's possible prejudice
is simply to recognize that the defendant has the clear alternative
of not abusing the judicial system generally and the judge person-
ally. If the defendant does choose to be abusive and disruptive, he
cannot complain about any prejudice he has created or about any
corrective measures which have been adopted to accord him a fair,
but orderly trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
All of the measures presently employed or suggested for the
control of disruptive defendants have shortcomings. By compari-
son, the proposed implied waiver of the right to trial by jury would
be more effective and economical. However, its constitutionality is
questionable.
ROBERT A. NARAGON
